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Abstract
This paper presents a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model that can explain cross-
country empirical regularities in geographical mobility, unemployment and labor market
institutions. Rational agents vote over unemployment insurance (UI), taking the dynamic
distortionary e.ects of insurance on the performance of the labor market into consideration.
Agents with higher cost of moving, i.e., more attached to their current location, prefer more
generous UI. The key assumption is that an agent’s attachment to a location increases the
longer she has resided there. UI reduces the incentive for labor mobility and increases,
therefore, the fraction of attached agents and the political support for UI. The main result is
that this self-reinforcing mechanism can give rise to multiple steady-states — one “European”
steady-state featuring high unemployment, low geographical mobility and high
unemployment insurance, and one “American” steadystate featuring low unemployment, high
mobility and low unemployment insurance.
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Europeans are substantially less mobile than Americans. For instance, in the early 90’s, the
yearly rate of migration across U.S. states was 3.2%, while the rate of regional migration
w a s1 . 3 - 1 . 4 %i nG e r m a n ya n dF r a n c e ,a n d0 . 6 %i nI t a l ya n dS p a i n . 1 Regional migration
in Japan, Canada, U.K. and Australia is larger than in continental Europe, but smaller
than in the U.S. Across countries, migration rates are negatively correlated with national
unemployment rates. Figure 1a plots yearly internal migration rates vs. standardized
OECD unemployment rates from 1980 to 1995 (ﬁve-year interval observations) for the nine
largest OECD countries; Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, the
U.K. and the U.S., showing that high-mobility countries are, on average, characterized by
lower unemployment (with a coeﬃcient of linear correlation equal to -0.5).2
Earlier micro studies conﬁrm that migration decisions are closely related to unemploy-
ment and job mobility. For instance, Bartel (1979) documents that the proportion of moves
in the U.S. caused by the decision to change jobs is one-half of all migration decisions for
young workers and one third of all migration decisions for workers above the age of 45. Sim-
ilarly, DaVanzo (1978) and Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989) document that unemployment
signiﬁcantly increases the likelihood of migration both in the U.S. and the U.K.3 Other
studies ﬁnd that the internal migration responds signiﬁcantly to temporary regional shocks
in the U.S. but not in Europe. In particular, Blanchard and Katz (1992) ﬁnd that regional
shocks give rise to large responses in cross-state migration in the U.S., whereas Decressin
and Fat´ as (1995) ﬁnd that the same type of shocks generate insigniﬁcant migration in Eu-
rope, where the main response comes through changes in regional labor participation and
1The diﬀerences are even larger considering that the average U.S. state is larger than the corresponding
regions in the Europan countries. In terms of average population, the size of a state in the U.S. is 5.2
millions versus 5.1 millions for Germany, 2.6 millions in France, 2.9 millions in Italy and 2.3 millions in
Spain. Similarly, the average geographical size of a U.S. state is much larger than that of a German region,
for instance.
2The rates of regional migration are from the OECD (2000), Table 2.10. We have omitted the ob-
servations for smaller OECD countries for which data are available (in particular, Belgium, Finland, the
Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden) since the regional units are substantially smaller, either in territorial size
or population, than those of larger countries, making the notion of regional mobility diﬃcult to compare.
Their inclusion would not alter the statistics of interest, however The correlation between mobility and the
unemployment rate remains negative (-0.37). The correlation between unemployment insurance and mo-
bility is also negative (-0.53), whereas the correlation between unemployment beneﬁts and unemployment
rates is positive (0.32).
3More recently, McCormick (1997) has documented that the high unemployment rate of manual workers
in the U.K. is due to their relatively low mobility.
1unemployment.
Cultural and language barriers can help explain why Europeans do not move across
countries, but they do not explain the low rate of regional migration within countries.
Institutions are therefore likely to play an important role. This paper argues that the gen-
erosity of the unemployment insurance (UI) system is an important factor in explaining the
puzzle. If mobility is costly, agents who are well insured against the risk of unemployment
will have a lower incentive to move to regain employment. This argument is consistent
with the evidence of a large negative cross-country correlation between mobility rates and
the generosity of UI. Figure 1b plots yearly internal migration rates vs. unemployment
i n s u r a n c ef o rt h es a m es a m p l ea sﬁgure 1a.4 As the ﬁgure shows, high-mobility countries
like Japan and the U.S. are characterized by low UI, whereas low-mobility countries like
France, Spain and Germany have the most generous insurance systems (the correlation is
-0.68).5 Finally, ﬁgure 1c shows that unemployment rates are positively correlated with the
generosity of the insurance systems, the correlation being 0.59.
In this paper, we construct a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model accounting
for these facts. The main contribution of the theory is to endogenize the choice of un-
employment insurance and its interaction with labor market performance. Namely, we do
not take diﬀerences in policies and institutions as exogenous, but explain them as the out-
come of a stylized political mechanism where rational agents vote over the insurance policy,
taking the dynamic eﬀects of UI on the performance of the labor market into consideration.
Our theory has two main building blocks. First, the attitude towards migration is path
dependent. The longer an agent lives in a particular location, the stronger is her attachment
to that location, either due to friendships, family ties, etc., or to the accumulation of
location-speciﬁc human capital that is lost when the worker moves. A number of studies
(Borjas et al. (1992), Krieg (1997)) have documented that migrants experience a temporary
reduction of earnings after a move, although this is later followed by high wage growth.
4Unemployment insurance is measured by the summary measure provided by the OECD Data-base on
Beneﬁt Entitlements and Gross Replacement Ratios.
5Italy is the main outlier. In Italy, the unemployment insurance system is among the least generous for
the countries in the sample, yet, mobility is very low. It should noticed, however, that high unemployment
areas in the South of Italy have been the target of a large ﬂow of regional transfers. Brunello et al. (1999) ﬁnd
that these subsidies signiﬁcantly reduced the South-North mobility. Note that our sample only includes one
observation for Italy, due to lack of comparable measures of beneﬁts for earlier years. For Spain, Bentolila
(1997) argues that institutional factors have signiﬁcantly contributed to the slowdown of mobility since the
1970’s. In particular, he mentions the increase in both the duration and coverage of unemployment beneﬁts,
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Figure 1: Geographical mobility, unemployment rates and unemployment insurance in the
9 largest OECD countries. 3Together with pecuniary and non-pecuniary set-up costs (e.g., housing transactions, cultural
assimilation), this reduces the attractiveness of migration. Empirical studies conﬁrm the
role of path dependence by documenting that the length of residence in the current location
is a major determinant of the probability of migration (Kaluzny (1975), DaVanzo (1978),
and Bartel (1979)).6
The other building block of our theory is that the attitude towards mobility inter-
acts with social preferences for publicly provided unemployment insurance, creating a self-
reinforcing mechanism. In a low-mobility society where more workers perceive migration
as costly, there will be a stronger political demand for unemployment insurance. Unem-
ployment insurance, in turn, deters mobility, implying that more agents get attached to
their locations, which ensures that the demand for UI is sustained over time. Our main
result is that a “European” steady-state featuring high unemployment, low migration and
high unemployment insurance can co-exist with an “American” steady-state featuring low
unemployment, high migration and low unemployment insurance.
The model economies are characterized by search frictions in the labor market and
mobility costs (close in spirit to Diamond (1981)). Workers diﬀer in their attachment
to the location where they live, and attachment grows stochastically with the length of
residence (for simplicity, we capture heterogeneity by assuming individuals to be either
attached or unattached). Attached workers face higher mobility costs and are less likely to
move. Migration is assumed to occur only to escape unemployment. In particular, workers
are stochastically laid-oﬀ. To simplify the analysis, we restrict the attention to “voluntary
unemployment”, and assume that a displaced worker can always be re-employed within the
period if she is willing to move when laid oﬀ. If she does not to want to migrate, however,
she faces a constant probability of receiving no job oﬀer and remaining unemployed.
An important assumption in our analysis is that the moving cost cannot be fully insured
by the government. We motivate this formally by assuming that individual attachment is
unobservable. We regard this assumption to be reasonable since the moving costs consist
of several individual speciﬁc components, some psychological some monetary, etc., many of
which are diﬃcult to objectively quantify.
6According to Bartel (1979), part of this observation is due to the correlation between job tenure and
length of residence. Since the probability of job separation decreases with tenure, workers who have been
resident in a certain location for a longer period of time suﬀer a lower probability of job separation. In our
theory, we assume, for simplicity, that job tenure has no eﬀect on the probability of separation. Tenure
dependence in separation rates, however, would only reinforce the results of our model, as long as this is
due to accumulation of human capital with a location speciﬁcc o m p o n e n t .
4In contrast to attachment, we assume that the government can observe whether an
individual is employed or not. Given this simpliﬁed description of the labor market ﬂows,
we study the political determination of UI. The median voter is realistically assumed to
be employed. Yet, since agents are risk averse and markets are incomplete, the UI system
provides insurance to employed workers, and a political demand for such system may arise.
Not all employed workers value UI to the same extent, though. For unattached workers,
moving is less costly (in fact, we make the simplifying assumption that moving is completely
costless for them). They still attribute a positive value to UI in anticipation of possibly
becoming attached in the future. But, since future utility is discounted, unattached workers
value UI less than attached workers.
The size of groups is assumed to determine their political inﬂuence via a standard ma-
jority voting mechanism. Thus, economies populated by a majority of attached workers
(Europe) will demand more UI than economies populated by a majority of unattached
workers (the U.S.). A generous UI system, in turn, deters mobility, by making unemploy-
ment less costly to the individual, and increases the proportion of attached workers in the
society. The self-reinforcing interaction between attachment and preferences for UI can
give rise to multiple steady-states. In particular, two economies populated by agents with
identical preferences but diﬀerent distributions of labor market characteristics may end up
choosing very diﬀerent degrees of social insurance, implying diﬀerent migration rates and
labor market performance. Moreover, these diﬀerences are self-sustained.
The result that multiple steady-states can exist is neither a priori obvious, nor is it true
in general. There are in fact two forces playing in opposite directions. On the one hand,
the fact that, due to its eﬀect on search behavior, high UI tends to make the median voter
more strongly geographically attached creates a self-reinforcing mechanism which tends to
generate multiple steady-states. On the other hand, insurance is more expensive (i.e., less
actuarially fair) for employed workers when there is a large initial stock of unemployed
workers. This eﬀect strengthens the political support for UI in an “American” situation,
relative to that of a “European” one, and plays against the self-reinforcing mechanism
generating multiple steady-states. Which eﬀect dominates depends on parameters and our
analytical results pin down the exact parameter conditions for multiplicity to arise.
We then calibrate a version of the model that allows for consumption smoothing through
savings. More precisely, we use data on mobility and unemployment to calibrate all param-
eters except for moving cost and risk aversion, and then compute which combinations of
moving cost and risk aversion give rise to multiplicity. We ﬁnd that the parameters required
for multiplicity seem empirically reasonable.
5Naturally, this paper does not argue that UI generosity is the only institutional factor
accounting for diﬀerences in labor market performance and mobility. For instance, Bover et
al. (1989), Cameron and Mullbauer (1998 and 2000) and Oswald (1997 and 1999) emphasize
the importance of the structure of home-ownership. Oswald (1997) argues that the share
of owner-occupied housing increases unemployment by deterring mobility. To the extent
that UI aﬀects the choice of house ownership, these ideas reinforce our argument, because
the purchase of a house is a sunk investment that further increases the cost of mobility.
Moreover, factors outside our model framework aﬀecting house ownership (such as the
quality of credit markets), can be interpreted as exogenous variations in mobility costs
across countries. Not surprisingly, our model predicts that countries with high exogenous
barriers to mobility tend to be characterized by a unique European steady state, whereas
countries with low barriers tend to be characterized by a unique American steady state.
Our endogenous policy mechanism is nevertheless operative, however, by magnifying small
exogenous diﬀerences into large diﬀerences in social insurance and labor market allocations.
Our paper relates to a growing stream of theoretical literature on UI and labor mar-
ket performance. The argument that unemployment insurance is an important factor in
explaining the large diﬀerences in unemployment rates and earnings inequality observed in
Western Europe and the United States during the last quarter of the twentieth century is
found, for instance, in Ljunqvist and Sargent (1998), Marimon and Zilibotti (1999), and
Mortensen and Pissarides (1999). Other papers have argued that UI aﬀects the quality
of the jobs created, with a non-monotonic eﬀect on output and eﬃciency (see Acemoglu
(2001) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999)). This literature treats UI as an exogenous in-
stitution, and only few authors have attempted to build a positive theory explaining why
such diﬀerent UI levels are observed across countries. The ﬁrst paper to explore this idea
is Wright (1986), which analyzes the trade oﬀ between transfer and insurance eﬀects when
employed workers decide about the UI level. More recent papers on the political economy of
UI include Hassler and Rodr´ ıguez Mora (1999) , Pallage and Zimmermann (2001) and Saint
Paul (1993, 1996 and 1997). None of these papers focuses on the eﬀects of insurance on
geographical mobility, however. More important, the novelty of our approach with respect
to this literature is that (i) we take into explicit consideration the two-way relationships
between labor market ﬂows and UI policy, and (ii) the general equilibrium nature of our
analysis allows us to calibrate the parameters of the model and study the implications of
the theory from a quantitative perspective.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the model environment.
In section 3, we deﬁne the equilibrium search behavior with an exogenous UI. In section
64, we deﬁne characterize the political equilibrium analytically under the assumption that
agents vote once-and-for all over constant beneﬁt sequences. We provide conditions such
that multiple steady-states exist. In section 5, we extend the model to allow for saving and
borrowing, and show that the main results of the model carry over to this more realistic
case. We also calibrate the parameters of the model in order to match a set of empirical
observations on labor market performance and migration rates in Europe and the U.S. The
result is that the region of the parameter space where multiple steady-states are sustained
contains realistic parameterizations. Section 6 concludes and discusses extension.
2 Model environment
2.1 Preferences
The model economy is assumed to be populated by a continuum of inﬁnitely lived risk averse







where σ is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion, ct denotes consumption, z parameterizes
the disutility of moving and ζ ∈ {0,1} is an indicator variable that takes the value one if a
worker moves from a location to which she is attached, and zero otherwise.
A worker’s labor income, paid at the end of each period, consists of a wage w if she
works and unemployment beneﬁts b ∈ [0,w] if she is unemployed. Taxes are levied lump
sum, implying that the disposable income is w − τ f o ra ne m p l o y e dw o r k e ra n db − τ
for an unemployed worker. In this section, we assume that agents do not have access
to capital markets, i.e., they can neither borrow nor save. This simpliﬁcation is made for
presentational purposes. We will later extend the model by endogenizing the saving decision
(section 5) and show that the qualitative results remain unchanged.
The economy has a large number of identical locations where job opportunities arise.
Workers are heterogenous in terms of their employment status (employed or unemployed)
and the degree of attachment to the location where they live (attached or unattached).
Workers move in and out of employment. In particular, employed workers face a constant
probability of being laid oﬀ and unemployed workers face an invariant distribution of job
oﬀers. More precisely, job searchers receive a job oﬀer in the location where they currently
live with probability π a n do n l yi no t h e rl o c a t i o n sw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y ,1−π. Attachment has
no eﬀects on the productivity of a worker. The only diﬀerence is that an attached worker
7suﬀers a cost z when moving to a diﬀerent location, whereas an unattached worker suﬀers
no such cost.7
The timing is as follows;
1. A fraction γ/(1 − π) of the workers are laid oﬀ.
2. All job searchers, including those just laid oﬀ, receive a job oﬀer. A share π receive
an oﬀer in their own current location and the remaining 1 − π receive job oﬀers only
from other locations.
3. A fraction α of the unattached employed workers become attached to their current
location.
4. Outstanding job oﬀers are accepted or rejected. Whenever an attached worker moves,
she pays a cost z out of her income in the new job and becomes unattached. Attached
workers, both employed and unemployed, who stay, remain attached. Clearly, all job
oﬀers raised “at home”, as well as all job oﬀers raised “abroad” by unattached workers
are accepted. The only non-trivial economic decision is made by attached unemployed
who only receive an oﬀer abroad, as they face a trade-oﬀ between paying a moving
cost z and becoming unemployed.
5. Wages and unemployment beneﬁts are paid, taxes collected, moving costs paid and
consumption takes place.
More formally, let the labor market status of an agent be denoted by ω and the set
of possible labor market states by Ω ≡ {a,n,u}, where a stands for attached employed
workers, n stands for unattached employed workers and u stands for unemployed workers.
Note that there are three labor market states only when individuals are rational, since all
unattached workers who are laid oﬀ can ﬁnd a new job immediately and without costs. An
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where γ is the probability that a worker is laid-oﬀ and not immediately rehired in her
own location, and α is the probability that an unattached workers becomes attached. The
7We will interpret these as geographical locations. Note, however, that an alternative interpretation
might be to regard locations as sectors of activity and attachment as sector-speciﬁch u m a nc a p i t a l .
8variable ν ∈ {0,1} describes the moving choice of attached workers. In particular, ν =0
describes a selective strategy, i.e., wait for an oﬀer at home rather than migrating, whereas
ν = 1 describes a nonselective strategy, i.e., migrating whenever no job is oﬀered at home.
Note that the decision of an attached worker who has just been laid oﬀ is identical to that
of a worker already in the unemployment pool.8
Displaced attached employed workers (ﬁrst row) become unemployed if they follow a
selective search strategy, ν = 0, whereas they move and become employed unattached
if they follow the nonselective strategy, ν =1( ﬁrst row). Unattached workers remains
unattached with probability 1 − α and become attached with probability α (second row).
Under no circumstance, they become unemployed. Unemployed individuals who
2.2 Distribution of employment and attachment
The aggregate state of the economy is described by the distribution of agents across labor
market states, deﬁned by attachment and employment status. More formally, let the vector
µt =( at,n t,u t) ∈ R3
+, where at+nt+ut = 1, describe such distribution at time t.T h ef o c a l
point of our model is the search behavior of the attached displaced workers. Conditional
on a time-invariant search behavior ν, the law of motion of the distribution of agents, µt,
is entirely deterministic and given by:9
µt = µt−1Γ(ν)( 3 )
The long run distributions conditional on ν, µs(ν), are given by the eigenvector associ-




















8Al a i do ﬀ attached employed worker who is oﬀered a job in another location earns w −z in the current
period if taking that job oﬀer, and b if rejecting it and going into unemployment. Similarly, a worker who
starts the period by being unemployed and is oﬀered a job opportunity abroad earns w −z if taking it, and
b if rejecting it. For both workers, mobility implies losing their attachment. Thus, their decision problems
are identical.
9With some abuse of notation, ν deﬁnes both the individual search strategy and the aggregate search
behavior governing the distribution of characteristics in the population. As we will see, however, individually
optimal search behavior is independent of aggregate search behavior. Our parsimonious representations
entails, therefore, no loss of generality.
9Consider ﬁrst µs (0). Under selective search behavior, all agents are attached in the
long-run. Since no attached agent ever pays the moving cost and becomes unattached,
there is no inﬂow into the group of unattached employed workers, whereas there is some
outﬂow, as α unattached workers become attached in every period. Next, consider µs (1).
Under nonselective search behavior, no agent ever becomes unemployed, and the long-
run distribution features a positive proportion of employed agents only. We interpret this
feature of the model as implying that, if agents are nonselective, there is no structural
unemployment. While some agents are laid oﬀ and transit from one job into another in
every period, the unemployment spell during this transition is shorter than a period. Thus,
frictional unemployment is excluded by the accounting of our model.
Throughout, we maintain the following parameter restrictions;
Assumption 1 0.5 >π>γ>α .
The assumption that all parameters are smaller than one half ensures that labor states
are persistent. The assumptions that π>γand γ>αensure that the attached employed
and unattached employed are in majority in each of the two long run distributions, µs (0)
and µs (1).
3 Equilibrium search behavior
Given the model environment, we proceed to analyze the agents’ private decisions. In
particular, we treat beneﬁt rates as exogenous and time invariant and analyze their eﬀect
on search behavior. Taxes and beneﬁts are constant over time and interdependent through
the government’s budget constraint. For tractability, we assume that the government can
perfectly smooth tax rates by running temporary deﬁcits or surpluses, ﬁnancing them by
international capital market operations. This allows us to explicitly consider transitional
dynamics. The government’s intertemporal budget constraint implies that the present
discounted value of government revenues and expenditures must be equal. Government
revenues consist of lump sum taxes, while the expenditures consist of transfers to the
unemployed. For simplicity, we assume that the interest rate faced by the government is
equal to the discount rate of private agents.
The tax rate balancing the government’s intertemporal budget is denoted τ (b,µ0,ν),
where b is a beneﬁt rate, µ0 is an initial distribution and ν ∈ {0,1} is a time-invariant
aggregate search behavior. Clearly, if ν = 1, there are no transfers. Thus, τ(b,µ0,1) = 0.


















ρ + π + γ
− n0
γρ
(ρ + α)(ρ + π + γ)
, (5)
and ut (0,µ 0)d e n o t e st h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ea tt i m et when agents search selectively and
the initial distribution is µ0. More formally, ut (0,µ 0) is the third component of the vector
µt ≡ Γ(0)tµ0, where Γ(0) is deﬁned by (2). The second equality is obtained by solving
the system of diﬀerence equations (3) under selective behavior (ν =0 ) . T(µ0)c a nb e
interpreted as the average discounted unemployment rate, which increases with the initial
share of unemployed and decreases with the initial share of unattached.
The value functions, deﬁned at the beginning of the period, for ω ∈ Ω,t a x e sτ and
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γ (1 + ρ)
Pa,ν.
We call Pω,0 the average discounted probability (ADP) of being unemployed for individ-
uals currently in state ω, conditional on a selective search strategy. Similarily, Pω,1 is the
ADP of having to pay the moving costs, conditional on the current state being ω and the
search strategy ν =1 .
We can now provide a formal deﬁnition of an equilibrium search behavior (ESB). The
ESB simply deﬁnes the optimal search behavior of attached workers, since these are the
agents who make nontrivial choices as discussed above.
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium search behavior (ESB), ν∗(b,µ0) ∈ {0,1},i sd e ﬁned
by ν∗(b,µ0) = argmaxν∈{0,1} Va(ν,τ(b,µ0,ν),b). In the case of indiﬀerence, behavior is
assumed to be non-selective, i.e. ν∗(b,µ0)=1 .
It should be noted that argmaxν∈{0,1} Vω(ν,τ(b,µ0,ν),b)i st h es a m ef o ra l lω ∈ {a,n,u}.
Furthermore, although the deﬁnition of ESB assumes committment, this is innocous since
10See appendix 7.1 for details.
11the optimal choice of search strategy is time-consistent. Finally, since all value functions
are proportional to eστ, ESB is independent of the tax-rate. This property, which is due to
the assumption of CARA utility, simpliﬁes the characterization of the ESB, summarized in
the following proposition:
Proposition 1
1. For any (b,µ0), there exists a unique ESB, ν∗(b,µ0) ∈ {0,1}.





Pa,0 (eσz − 1)
´
. (A) If ¯ b<0, then ν∗(b,µ0)=0for all b ∈ [0,1].
(B) If ¯ b ≥ 0,t h e nν∗(b,µ0)=1for all b ≤ ¯ b and ν∗(b,µ0)=0for all b>¯ b.




Pa,1 (eσz − 1)e−σw, then ν =0( ν = 1) is optimal. Apart from trivial cases where
selective behavior is always optimal (e.g., prohibitive mobility costs, see part 2A of the
Proposition), the equilibrium has threshold properties; for insurance above (below) a certain
level ¯ b, selective (nonselective) behavior is optimal. Note that the threshold is increasing in
w and decreasing in z. Finally, note that, under full insurance (b = w), selective behavior
is always optimal.
4 Political Equilibrium
So far, the beneﬁt rate has been taken as exogenous. In this section, we determine b as
the endogenous outcome of a political mechanism, based on majority voting. The main
result is that multiple steady-states can be sustained. In particular, two economies with
identical parameters but diﬀerent initial distributions may end up, respectively, in a steady-
state with high beneﬁts, low mobility and high unemployment or in a steady-state with
no beneﬁts, high mobility and low unemployment. In the benchmark case studied in this
section, agents vote once-and-for-all for a constant sequence of beneﬁts (implying a constant
sequence of tax rates). In this environment, we obtain transparent analytical results. In the
concluding section, we discuss the extension of the analysis to an environment characterized
by repeated voting, where agents vote over beneﬁt rates in each period, and the government
budget must balance on a period-by-period basis. While dynamic voting complicates the
analysis, the main results of the paper carry over to this extension.
We now introduce a deﬁnition of Political Equilibrium, conditional on the existence of
a politically decisive agent (or group). Note that if the initial distribution is a steady-
12state (either µs (0) or µs (1)), the existence of a decisive voter is not an issue, as absolute
majorities exist.
Deﬁnition 2 A political equilibrium, conditional on an initial distribution µ0, is an
allocation {ν∗,τ∗,b ∗} such that:
1. All agents choose search policies maximizing their expected discounted utility, i.e.,
ν∗ = ν∗(b∗,µ 0) is an ESB.
2. The tax rate balances the intertemporal government budget constraint, i.e., τ∗ =
τ (b∗,µ 0,ν∗).
3. The politically decisive agent sets b∗ so as to maximize her expected discounted util-
ity, i.e., b∗ =a r g m a x b ˜ Vd(b,µ0),w h e r e˜ Vd denotes the value function of the politi-
cally decisive agent, incorporating the equilibrium search behavior, i.e. ˜ Vω (b,µ0) ≡
Vω(ν∗(b,µ0),τ(b,µ0,ν∗(b,µ0)),b).
Deﬁnition 3 A steady-state political equilibrium (SSPE) is a political equilibrium
with the additional requirement that µ0 = µs(ν∗(b∗,µ 0)),i . e . ,µ0 is the ergodic distribution
associated with the ESB ν∗(b∗,µ 0).
A c c o r d i n gt oD e ﬁnition 2, the equilibrium beneﬁtr a t e ,b∗, maximizes the utility of the
politically decisive group at time zero. The assumption of once-and-for-all voting may be
regarded as an approximation to a world where voting cycles are long. A key shortcoming of
this approach is that, in general, as the distribution of agents changes, political preferences
might also change. The level of b chosen at time zero may then no longer reﬂect the
preferences of the living agents. By restricting the attention to SSPE, however, we avoid
this possibility. In a SSPE where we let agents decide once-and-for-all, the outcome of the
vote would not change if the ballot were to be (unexpectedly) repeated some time in the
future. The institutions inherited from the past will therefore always reﬂect the preferences
of the current generation.
It is also important to note that our notion of equilibrium is consistent with perfectly
rational political behavior. When agents vote over a policy, they take into consideration the
eﬀects of alternative policy choices on transitional dynamics and tax rates. The assumption
that there will be no vote in the future only means that agents do not have to be concerned
with the eﬀects of their vote today on future political decisions.11
11In other work (e.g. Hassler et al., 2001), we have emphasized the eﬀect of current political choices on
future political outcomes.
13We shall identify two candidate steady-state equilibria. One is characterized by a ma-
jority of unattached employed workers voting for a beneﬁtr a t es u ﬃciently low to generate
nonselective behavior in equilibrium. In this candidate SSPE, referred to as an American
Equilibrium (SSPE), µ0 = µs (1). The other steady-state instead features a majority of
attached employed workers voting for a beneﬁtr a t es u ﬃciently high to generate selective
behavior in equilibrium. In this candidate SSPE, referred to as a European Equilibrium
(SSPE), µ0 = µs (0).
4.1 The American Equilibrium.
In an American SSPE, the unattached employed workers decide over the unemployment
insurance policy. This policy implies zero unemployment beneﬁts, and high mobility. For-




i.e., the unattached workers ﬁnd it optimal to vote for zero beneﬁts starting from the
distribution µs (1), which induces nonselective behavior.12
The American equilibrium can be characterized as follows.
Proposition 2
An American SSPE exists if and only if
w ≥
(
w(z) if z ≤ zA











































TA ≡ T(µs (1)) =
(γ + α + ρ)αγ
(γ + α)(π + γ + ρ)(α + ρ)
12In fact, any beneﬁt level below ¯ b gives the agents the same utility. Formally, Vn(1,τ(0,µ
s(1),0),0) =
Vn(1,τ(b,µ
s(1)),b)f o ra l lb<¯ b. The reason is that while there is a positive unemployment insurance,
nobody is ever unemployed in equilibrium and τ(b<¯ b,µ
s(1)) = 0. Without loss of generality, we assume
that b = 0 is chosen in this case. This would also be the choice under the realistic assumption that setting
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Figure 2: Multiple SSPE with no savings
with wA (0) > 0,w 0
A (z) > 0,w(0) = 0, w0 (z) > 0, wA (z) ≥ w(z) and wA (z)=w(z) iﬀ
z = zA.
TA can be interpreted as the average discounted unemployment rate when µ0 = µs (1)and
workers search selectively. Moreover, TA >P n,0, implying that the unemployment insur-
ance is less than actuarially fair for the unattached agents, since it transfers resources, in
present discounted value terms, from the unattached to the attached. Figure 2 (left hand
panel) illustrates Proposition 2. The condition w>w (z) ensures that the threshold ¯ b
is positive, so that non-selective behavior is optimal for a range of non-negative b. Thus,
whenever w<w (z), non-selective search behavior cannot be induced and the American
SSPE does not exist. The condition w>w A (z) implies, instead, that the expected utility
of choosing a non-selective search strategy and setting beneﬁts to zero is higher than that
of choosing a selective search strategy and setting b = ˜ bn,A,w h e r e









denotes the most preferred unemployment beneﬁt for unattached workers, conditional on
selective search behavior. Thus, w>w A (z)i ss u ﬃcient for the existence of an American
SSPE. In fact, this condition is also necessary as long as ˜ bn,A > ¯ b.T h i si sa l w a y st h ec a s e
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Figure 3: American SSPE
when z>z A.W h e nz<z A, however, ˜ bn,A < ¯ b and the unattached median voter always
prefer b =0o v e ra n yb ≥ ¯ b. In this case the American SSPE is also sustained in the range
w ∈ [w(z),w A (z)].
Figure 3 represents the value functions of the decisive unattached workers in two cases
where an American equilibrium exists. In both cases, the value functions feature a down-
ward discontinuity at ¯ b since, there, taxes increase from zero to ¯ bTA. The left hand panel
represents a case where z<z A. Whenever z<z A, the value function of the unattached
workers is non-increasing and strictly downward sloping for b ≥ ¯ b. Thus, the unattached
median voter chooses no UI and the American SSPE is sustained as long as w>w (z),
i.e., the non-selective search behavior is optimal absent UI (the picture represents a case
where w ∈ (w(z),w A (z))). The right hand panel represents a case where z>z A.I nt h i s
case, the value function of the unattached workers is non-monotonic. After the discrete fall
at ¯ b,i tﬁrst increases and then decreases with a local maximum at ˜ bn,A.T h e A m e r i c a n
equilibrium exists as long as w>w A (z), which ensuring that ˜ Vn has its global maximum
at b =0 ,a si nt h eﬁgure.
In summary, an American SSPE is sustained when w is suﬃciently large and z is
suﬃciently low. Intuitively, w is the social opportunity cost of unemployment, while z
is a measure of the cost of nonselective behavior. The lowest wage consistent with an
American equilibrium (either w(z)o rwA (z), depending on z)i si n c r e a s i n gi nz, as larger
mobility costs require higher wages in order for the American SSPE to survive. As z →∞ ,
16wA (z) approaches its asymptote z
TA and the critical condition for the American SSPE to be
sustained can be written as w−z>w −wTA.N o t i n gt h a tTA equals the average discounted
unemployment rate, w − wTA is the income under selective behavior and full insurance we
ﬁnd that American equilibrium is sustained if and only if unemployment insurance provides
agents with an average income that is lower than w − z, i.e., the worst realization in the
case of no insurance.13
Finally, risk aversion aﬀects the position of the threshold, zA, and the shape of the
curves wA (z)a n dw(z), but not their ranking (i.e., wA (z) >w(z), irrespective of σ). A
lower σ increases the range of parameters such that ˜ bn,A ≤ 0.
4.2 The European Equilibrium.
In a European SSPE, the attached employed workers are in majority and implement their
most preferred UI policy. Given this policy, attached workers prefer to be unemployed than
not move to get jobs. The European equilibrium exists if either ¯ b<0 (selective behavior is
optimal even at zero UI) or ¯ b ≥ 0 and attached workers vote for a beneﬁt level higher than




















and TE ≡ T(µs (0)) =
γ
π+γ >T A (hence, τ(b,µs(0),0) = TEb˙ ). Due to assumption 1,
TE >P a,0 =
(1+ρ)γ
ρ+π+γ, and the UI is less than actuarially fair for the attached in the European
13Formally, when z>z A, (7) can be rewritten
















Pn,0(1−TA). The LHS is the expected utility from non-selective behavior given
no UI and the RHS is the expected utility from selective behavior given b = ˜ bn,A. Letting z and w tend to
inﬁnity at a constant rate, yields the condition w −z>w−wTA. The intuition is that under non-selective
behavior, the expected utility becomes dominated by the income in the worst state (when paying the moving
cost), since the size of the gamble w − z becomes inﬁnitely large. Under selective behavior, however, the
size of the gamble is endogeneous and due to the CARA assumption constant and equal to d.A sw goes to
inﬁnity the inﬂuence of d vanishes and expected utility becomes determined by average income (w −wTA).
17a V











Figure 4: European equilibria
equilibrium, i.e., it entails a transfer, in present discounted value terms, from the employed
to the unemployed. Thus, the employed workers never set full insurance in equilibrium, i.e.,
˜ ba,E <w .
The following proposition states necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of
a European equilibrium.
Proposition 3
The European SSPE exists if and only if
w<
(
w(z) if z ≤ zE
wE (z) >w(z) if z>z E






























ln(1 + Pa,1 (eσz − 1))
with wE (0) > 0,w 0
E (z) > 0,w E (z) ≥ w(z) and wE (z)=w(z) iﬀ z = zE.
Consider again Figure 2 (left hand panel). A European SSPE exists whenever w<
w(z), as in this region selective search behavior prevails irrespective of beneﬁts. In the
region where w<w E (z), the expected utility for the attached median voter is higher if she
sets b = ˜ ba,E and chooses a selective search strategy than if she sets b = 0 and chooses a
non-selective search strategy. Thus, w<w E (z) is a necessary condition for the existence
18of a European SSPE. This condition is also suﬃcient as long as ˜ ba,E > ¯ b,w h i c hi sa l w a y s
the case when z>z E.W h e nz<z E, however, ˜ ba,E < ¯ b and a European equilibrium can
only exist if, for any beneﬁt level, including b =0 , agents choose the selective behavior, i.e.
if w<w(z).14
Figure 4 represents the value functions of the decisive attached workers in two cases
where a European equilibrium exists. The left hand panel represents a case where z<z E.
The value function of the decisive voter is in this case downward sloping and there is no UI
in equilibrium. Attached agents, however, do not move and there is unemployment. Thus, a
European SSPE is sustained. The right hand panel represents a more interesting case where
z>z E and w>w E (z), and there is positive UI in equilibrium. The value function of the
unattached workers is non-monotonic. After the discrete fall at ¯ b,i tﬁrst increases and then
decreases with a local maximum at ˜ ba,E. This is in fact a global maximum (as guaranteed
by the condition that w>w E (z)) and this guarantees the existence of a European SSPE.
In summary, a European equilibrium tends to be sustained when w is suﬃciently low
and z is suﬃciently large. The larger the mobility cost the larger the range of wages
consistent with a European equilibrium. As z →∞ ,w E (z) approaches its asymptote
z
TE implying that the critical condition for the European equilibrium to be sustained is
that w − wTE ≥ w− z. Thus, when the moving cost becomes very large, the European
equilibrium is sustained if and only if average income under selective behavior is at least as
large as w − z. Finally, reducing σ increases the range of parameters such that ˜ ba,E =0 .
4.3 Multiple SSPE
The results obtained so far can be summarized as follows. In economies with small mobility
costs (z) and high wages (w), the majority of agents prefer to avoid the distortionary eﬀects
of unemployment insurance and are prepared to migrate to avoid unemployment. In these
economies, an American SSPE tends to be sustained. In contrast, in economies with large
mobility costs and low wages, the majority of agents prefer an unemployment insurance
system in spite of its being less than actuarially fair for the employed workers. A European
SSPE tends therefore to be sustained.
In this section, we prove that it is, in fact, possible that both an American and a
European SSPE can be sustained in economies sharing the same structural parameters,
and diﬀering only in their initial distribution of labor market states. Hence, our model
14If z<z E and w>w (z), the value function of the attached workers is non-increasing and strictly
downward sloping for b ≥ ¯ b>0. Thus, the attached median voter chooses no UI and the European SSPE
is not sustained.
19predicts that even if mobility costs were identical across countries, it would be possible
to observe economies with very diﬀerent rates of geographical mobility and unemployment
insurances with stable majorities supporting the existing labor market institutions.
The main result of this section can be stated after introducing an additional assump-
tion.15
Assumption 2 α<¯ α, where
¯ α ≡
π2 − D +
q
(π2 − D)
2 +4( π + ρ(1 − γ))(ρπ2 + ρ(γ2 + ρ)π − γD)
2(π + ρ(1 − γ))
> 0,
and D ≡ ρ(1 − γ)(γ + ρ).
Assumption 2 imposes a lower bound to the persistence of the state of non-attachment.
The assumption implies that the beneﬁt level preferred by attached workers in a European
steady-state exceed the level preferred by unattached workers in an American steady-state,
i.e., ˜ ba,E > ˜ bn,A,w h e r e˜ bn,A and ˜ ba,E are deﬁned in (8) and (11), respectively. More formally,











Note that, on the one hand, the ADP of being unemployed is higher for attached than
for unattached workers (Pa,0 >P n,0), which tends to make the left-hand-side smaller than
the right-hand-side and therefore to attached workers prefer higher beneﬁts. We call this
the median-voter eﬀect. On the other hand, TE >T A, since the tax burden of ﬁnancing UI
is larger when starting from a European steady-state with a positive stock of unemployment
than from an American steady-state. This tax-eﬀect pulls the balance of the inequality in
the opposite direction. The assumption that α<¯ α implies that the diﬀerence between Pa,0
and Pn,0 is suﬃciently large so that the median-voter eﬀect dominates the tax-eﬀect and
˜ ba,E > ˜ bn,A. As we will see, this is a necessary condition for existence of multiple SSPE.
Additional restrictions on w and z will give the necessary and suﬃcient conditions.
Assumption 2 has the following implications.
Lemma 1 Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. Then;
1. There exists a unique ˜ z such that, ∀z ∈ (zA,∞),zR ˜ z ⇔ wA (z) R wE (z), and
2. ˜ z>z A >z E.
15The set of parameters satisfying both Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 is non-empty (see proof of
L e m m a1f o rd e t a i l s ) .
20Lemma 1 can be illustrated with the aid of Figure 2. Assumption 2 ensures that, as in
the case represented in the Figure, (i) zA >z E and (ii) the schedule wA (z) is steeper than
the schedule wE (z), implying that there exists a compact region of the plane where both
the American and the European SSPE are sustained. This region is characterized by the
following key Proposition of the paper.
Proposition 4
Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. Then, an American and a European SSPE co-exist if
and only if




[w(z),w A (z)] if z ∈ [zE,z A]
[wE (z),w A (z)] if z ∈ [zA, ˜ z]
where w(z),w A (z),w E (z),z A,z E, ˜ z,¯ α are deﬁned in Propositions 2 and 3, Assumption
2a n dL e m m a1 .
The proof follows immediately from Propositions 2 and 3 and from Lemma 1. The
following Corollary, which follows immediately from Propositions 2 and 3 and from Lemma
1, can also be stated.
Corollary 1 Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. Then, no SSPE exists if and only if z>˜ z
and w ∈ [wA (z),w E (z)].
Proposition 4 and its corollary establish that if z<˜ z, at least one SSPE exists. For
a range of low z, z ∈ [0,z A], the SSPE is unique whereas, for a range of intermediate z,
z ∈ [zA, ˜ z], multiple SSPE are possible. If z>˜ z, ﬁnally, wA (z) >w E (z) and there is
a range of w where no SSPE exists, as stated by Corollary 1. The right hand panel of
Figure 2 illustrates these ﬁndings by distinguishing the areas of uniqueness, multiplicity
and non-existence of SSPE.
The intuition behind these results is the following. Two forces play in opposite direc-
tions. On the one hand, when the median voter is unattached, she tends to be less keen
on social insurance than attached workers. The reason is that agents discount the future,
and the prospect of unemployment is further away in time for unattached than for attached
workers. Thus, the American median voter tends to oppose an insurance system, while
the European median voter tends to support it and this “median voter eﬀect” tends to
21generate multiple steady-states. On the other hand, since TE >T A, the cost of setting up
s o c i a li n s u r a n c ei na nA m e r i c a ns t e a d y - s t a t e is lower than the cost of keeping it in place
in a European steady-state. The reason is that in the American equilibrium, there are no
unemployed to start with. This “tax eﬀect” tends to generate non-existence rather than
multiplicity of steady-states. If the preferences of the median voter were not suﬃciently
diﬀerent, it is possible that the American voters would introduce an insurance system, while
the European voters dismantle it. By imposing that non-attachment is suﬃciently persis-
tent, assumption 2 ensures that there is enough diversity in preferences between attached
and unattached workers so that multiple SSPE can arise.
As we have noted above, at very high moving costs, the existence of the European
(American) SSPE depends on whether average income under selective behavior is larger
(smaller) income net of moving cost. However, since TE >T A, there will exist combinations
of very high z and w, such that UI is capable of doing this when taxes are given by bTA
but incapable when taxes are given by bTE. Then neither of the SSPE exists, i.e., if the
initial unemployment rate is zero, the unattached voters prefer beneﬁts above the threshold
and when the initial unemployment is
γ
π+γ, the attached voters prefer beneﬁts below the
threshold. Without savings, the region of non-existence exists for all parameters. As we
will see in the next section, this is no longer true when we allow individuals to have access
to a capital market.
To conclude, we note that risk aversion aﬀects the range of wages and mobility costs that
are consistent with multiple SSPE. In particular, lowering σ shifts the region of parameters
featuring multiplicity in ﬁgure 2 to the North-East. Furthermore, for suﬃciently low σ and
given w, ˜ ba,E < 0a n d˜ bn,A < 0 in which case multiple SSPE cannot exists. In the limit
case where σ → 0 (risk neutrality) the region of multiplicity disappears. Risk aversion is
therefore crucial for our results.
5 Allowing private capital accumulation
In this section, we enrich the model by adding two assumptions; ﬁnite lives and access to
capital markets. As we will see, these extensions have no impact on the qualitative results
of the model, but allow a more realistic calibration.16
Finite lives are introduced by assuming that individuals face a constant probability
δ ∈ [0,1] of dying in each period.17 The population is assumed to be constant over time;
16A more formal discussion, containing proofs of the claims in this section, can be found in the appendix.
17In order to ensure a majority of attached (unattached) in steady state when individual behavior is
22in every period, a measure δ of newborn agents replace those who die. Agents are born
with zero assets, and are assumed to be unattached. The latter assumption is motivated
by the empirical observation that moving rates fall with age. It implies, realistically, that a
European SSPE will feature a positive rate of geographical mobility. We also assume that
individuals have access to a perfect capital market, including a perfect annuity market (as
in Blanchard, 1985), without borrowing constraints. The only imperfection maintained is
that employment risk cannot be insured, other than through buﬀer stock savings.
Agents maximize (1), subject to sequence of dynamic budget constraints,
xt+1 =( 1+ρ)(xt + it − ζtz − τ − ct), (12)
x denoting ﬁnancial assets and it ∈ {w,b} earnings, and to a standard no-Ponzi game con-
dition. We assume a constant risk-free interest rate, denoted by r =( 1+ρ)(1 − δ) − 1,
which is equal to the subjective discount rate conditional on survival (ρ being the uncon-
ditional subjective discount rate, coherent with equation (1)). Under this assumption, if
labor income, it, were deterministic, agents would choose a ﬂat consumption path with no
savings.
Our choice of CARA utility has the important advantage that neither search nor mobil-
ity decisions depend on asset holding (as in Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999), nor do preferences
over UI. More general preferences would imply that the distribution of individual wealth
enters as a state variable, which would severely complicate the analysis (see Gomes, Green-
wood and Rebelo (1998) for an example of a search model with self-insurance). The impact
of individual wealth on job search and mobility is, empirically, ambiguous and remains an
open issue in the literature.
For an inﬁnite sequence of constant tax rates τ and beneﬁt rates b,t h estate of an agent
consists of her asset holdings, xt, and her labor market status ω ∈ Ω. Due to the CARA
utility speciﬁcation, the value function is separable in asset holdings and labor market
status. More speciﬁcally, the expected utility of an agent with asset holdings xt ∈ R and








where cω (ν) are constants solving the individual ﬁrst-order conditions for optimally choos-
ing consumption (proof in appendix).
selective (nonselective), we assume 0 <α≤ γ + η and 0 <γ<(α − η)
π+η
α+η.
23Individual consumption equals capital income,
ρ
1+ρxt + cω (ν), where
cω (0) = w − τ − sω,0 (w − b), (14)
cω (1) = w − τ − sω,1 (z).
Saving under selective behavior (sω,0 (w − b)) is independent of assets, and is a strictly
increasing function of the diﬀerence between income loss during unemployment, w − b.
Similarly, saving under nonselective behavior (sω,1 (z)), is a strictly increasing function of
the mobility cost, z. Without search frictions or under full insurance, agents would not
engage in any savings, i.e., sω,0 (0) = sω,1 (0) = 0.
The attached employed workers choose selective behavior if and only if it implies lower
saving than nonselective behavior, i.e., iﬀ sa,0 (w − b) ≤ sa,1 (z). It is straightforward to
show that sa,0 (w − b) ≤ sa,1 (z) ⇔ sn,0 (w − b) ≤ sn,1 (z). Since s0
n,0 (w − b) > 0, it is
possible to deﬁne the inverse function s−1
n,0 (sn,1 (z)) and conveniently rewrite the condition
for selective (non-selective) behavior to be optimal as
b>(≤)w − s−1
n,0 (sn,1 (z)) ≡ ¯ b. (15)
This is the generalization of Proposition 1 to economies where agents can self-insure through
borrowing and savings.
When choosing the beneﬁt level, the median voter takes into account the eﬀect of
her choice on search behavior and taxes. Taxes are given by τ(b,µs (0),0) = bTE and
τ(b,µs (1),0) = bTA,w h e r e ,a sb e f o r e ,TE ≥ TA and TE = TA if and only if r =0 .18
We now study the conditions for existence and multiplicity of the European and Amer-
ican SSPE. We start by noting that, like in the no-saving case, the European SSPE exists
and is unique if ¯ b<0, since, in this case, selective behavior is optimal for any feasible
b. The condition ¯ b = 0 in (15) deﬁnes a threshold wage w(sn,1 (z)) ≡ s−1
n,0 (sn,1 (z)) such
that a unique European SSPE exists for all w<w(sn,1 (z)). Since the function sn,0 (.)i s
increasing and convex (proof in the appendix), the inverse function, w(sn,1 (z)),is concave
and increasing in sn,1 (z)( s e eﬁgure 5).
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24A European SSPE also exists if ¯ b>0, and the utility of the European attached decisive












where, consistently with the notation used in the previous section,19
˜ ba,E ≡ argmax
b≤w
{w − bTE − sa,0 (w − b)}.
We can interpret the RHS of (16) as the insurance value that the attached median voter
attributes to her most preferred UI, ˜ ba,E, when she has the alternative option of moving to
escape unemployment. The LHS is the tax cost of implementing ˜ ba,E.N o t et h a t ,i f˜ ba,E is




sa,0 (w − b)|b=˜ ba,E = TE. (17)
Equation (17) implies that ˜ ba,E increases one-for-one in w. T h es a m ei st r u ei ft h ec o n s t r a i n t
b ≤ w binds. Therefore, the value of insurance (the RHS of (16)) is independent of w while,
for the same reason, the cost of insurance (the LHS of (16)) increases linearly in w. Hence,
there exists a unique threshold wage that equates the LHS to the RHS of (16). We denote
this threshold by wE (sa,1 (z)), and note that, for all w<w E (sa,1 (z)), (16) is satisﬁed
and a European SSPE exists. The threshold wE is linearly increasing (with slope T−1
E )
in sa,1 (z). For future comparisons, however, it is useful to express wE as a function of
sn,1 (z), instead of sa,1 (z). In the appendix, we show that sn,1 (z) is an increasing convex
transformation of sa,1 (z). This justiﬁes expressing wE as a concave function of sn,1 (z),
wE = wE (sn,1 (z))(see ﬁgure 5).
A sn o t e da b o v e ,a nA m e r i c a nS S P Ec a no n l ye x i s ti fw ≥ w(sn,1 (z)), implying that
¯ b>0. In addition, the American unattached median voter prefers to set zero UI to any












where ˜ bn,A ≡ argmaxb≤w {w − bTA − sn,0 (w − b)}.B o t h ˜ bn,A and ¯ b, as discussed above,
increase one-for-one in w, and, hence, the RHS of (18) is independent of w,w h e r e a st h e
19Note that, when δ is suﬃciently high and α suﬃciently low, the UI system is more than actuarially fair
for the attached employed worker, in which case the condition b ≤ w binds. In this case, the European








A w E w
,1() nE sz ,1() nA sz
Figure 5: Multiple SSPE with saving
LHS increases linearly with w.T h u s ,( 1 8 )d e ﬁnes a unique threshold wage, wA (sn,1 (z)),
such that, if w ≥ wA, (18) is satisﬁed and an American SSPE exists. The threshold wA is
linearly increasing in sn,1 (z), with slope equal to T−1
A (see ﬁgure 5).
L e tu sn o wt u r nt ot h ep o s s i b i l i t yo fm u l t i p l eS S P E .A si nt h ec a s eo fn os a v i n g s ,a
necessary condition for multiple SSPE to arise is that, were all agents forced to adopt a
selective search behavior, the European attached median voter would prefer higher beneﬁts
than her American unattached counterpart. More formally, we need that ˜ bn,A (sn,1 (z)) <
˜ ba,E (sn,1 (z)). Unfortunately, we cannot express this condition as a close-form parametric
restriction like Assumption 2. We can however ensure that the set of parameters consistent
with the condition is non-empty.
Inspecting (16) and (18), we ﬁnd, similarly to the no-saving case, two opposite forces.
The “median voter eﬀect” shows up in the fact that − ∂
∂bsa,0 (w − b) > − ∂
∂bsn,0 (w − b)
(proof in the appendix), whereas the “tax eﬀect” is given, as before, by TE ≥ TA. If the
former eﬀect dominates the latter, then ˜ bn,A > ˜ ba,E. An example where this occur is when
r approaches zero. In this case, TA− TE → 0, i.e., the “tax eﬀect” vanishes, whereas, due
to the positive mortality rate, subjective discount rates remain strictly positive, preventing
the “median voter eﬀect” from also vanishing. While this example hinges on the OLG
structure introduced in this section, it is possible to prove, by means of examples, that
multiple SSPE can also arise when δ = 0 (see section 5.1 for an example).
26Figure 5 illustrates the results of this section. We plot the three threshold schedules
w(sn,1 (z)), wE (sn,1 (z)) and wA (sn,1 (z)) as functions of the savings of the unattached
workers, conditional on nonselective behavior. Similarly to ﬁgure 2, there are two critical
values, sn,1 (zA)a n dsn,1 (zE), such that curves wA and w and curves wE and w, respec-
tively, are tangent. Since sn,1 (z) is an increasing function of z, higher precautionary saving
maps one-to-one into larger mobility costs. The American SSPE is sustained for combi-
nations of w and sn,1 (z) lying above the upper envelope of w(sn,1 (z)) and wA (sn,1 (z)),
whereas the European SSPE is sustained for combinations of w and sn,1 (z) lying below the
upper envelope of w(sn,1 (z)) and wE (sn,1 (z)). As the ﬁgure shows, sn,1 (zA) >s n,1 (zE),
or equivalently, ˜ bn,A < ˜ ba,E, implies the existence of a range of multiple SSPE.20
5.1 Calibration
In this section, we investigate whether the parameter range where multiplicity arises is
economically reasonable. For this purpose, we calibrate the model. We assume that a
period is one quarter and set the average duration of a working life to forty years with a
constant population size. In addition, we assume the interest rate, r, to be 4% per year and
calibrate the three remaining parameters of the transition matrix, α, γ,a n dπ as follows.
1. As noted in the introduction, the rate of geographical mobility in the U.S. is approx-
imately three times as large as in Western European countries. In our model, the
migration rate in an American and a European SSPE are γ and γ · nE, respectively,
where nE = δ/(δ + α(1 − δ)) denotes the European steady-state share of employed
non-attached workers. Thus, given δ,w es e tα such that nE =1 /3. This implies an
20In the appendix, we show that the curve wE is asymptotically linear with slope (1 + ρ)/TE.W h e n
mobility costs become very high, the condition for the existence of the European (American) SSPE is thus
that
wTe
1+ρ (wTA) is smaller (larger) than the saving of the unattached under nonselective behavior. This
condition is analogous with the case of no savings, except for the fact that the moving cost z is replaced by
the saving induced by the moving cost. Thus, if and only if (1 + ρ)/TE < 1/TA, the schedules wE (sn,1 (z))
and wA (sn,1 (z)) eventually cross, and there is a region of parameters such that no SSPE exists. However,
this condition need not hold. If, for example, r is suﬃciently small, then (1 + ρ)/TE > 1/TA and, in contrast
to the case of no saving, at least one SSPE exists for any parameter conﬁguration.
27average duration of non-attachment of almost twenty years (α =0 .0126).21 22
2. The parameter π is the inverse of the duration of unemployment. As our model
abstracts from frictional unemployment, our notion of unemployment is long-term
unemployment.T o i d e n t i f y π, we assume that all frictional unemployed are rehired
within one quarter. Using data from table 1 in Machin and Manning (1999), the
weighted average share of unemployed in Europe who have been unemployed for
more than 6 and 12 months can be computed to be 66.4% and 48.1%, respectively.
The corresponding ﬁgures for the U.S. are 17.3% and 9.7%, conﬁrming that long-term
unemployment is negligible in the U.S.. In the model, the hazard rate from unem-
ployment is constant and the probability of an unemployed not ﬁnding a job within
two periods is (1 − π)
2.T h u s , π is estimated by setting (1 − π)
2 =0 .481/0.664,
yielding π =0 .149. This implies an expected unemployment duration of about 20
months, which is longer than the average unemployment duration in European coun-
tries (the weighted average from Eurostat data is 13 months, see Table 5 in Machin
and Manning (1999)). Our deﬁnition of unemployment, however, does not include
frictional unemployment, and the relevant ﬁgure is the average duration for long-term
unemployed. Thus, we regard 20 months as a reasonable ﬁgure.
3. We calibrate γ, given our previous estimates of α and π, so as to generate an un-
employment rate in the European steady-state of 8.2%. This unemployment target
is motivated as follows: the weighted average unemployment rate in Europe was
10.8% in 1995 (standardized unemployment rates from the OECD Economic Out-
look), compared to 5.5% in the U.S.. Given our measure of π, and given the data
on unemployment longer than 6 months, the implied frictional unemployment rates
21An alternative procedure to estimate α would be to use data on the cross-sectional age proﬁle of moving
rates. Since all newborn workers are assumed to be non-attached, our model predicts a declining age proﬁle
of mobility in the European SSPE. Formally, the average moving rate for a cohort of age t, γ (t), in a
European SSPE, is given by γ(t)=( 1− α) · γ(t − 1). This relationship allows us to identify α using data
o nt h er a t ea tw h i c ht h em o v i n gr a t ei sf a l l i n gw i t ha g e in European countries. Pooling data from France,
Germany and the United Kingdom (the large European countries for which we could ﬁnd data on migration
conditional on age) on workers aged between 25 and 45 (to minimize the eﬀect of retirement), we estimate
the expected duration of non-attachment to be 16.4y e a r s .T h i sﬁgure is close to our benchmark estimate.
If one calibrates the remaining parameters using this alternative estimate of α, the results of the model are
practically undistinguishable from our benchmark calibration.
22One could, in principle, use absolute migration rates to pin down even γ. We decided against this option


























Figure 6: SSPE’s in the calibrated economy (σ in log scale)
are 1.3% and 4.2% for Europe and the U.S., respectively.23 The diﬀerence in long-
term unemployment between Europe and the U.S. is then 8.2%, which implies setting
γ =0 .0218.
Our calibration of α, π and γ implies that there is a majority of unattached workers in
the U.S. (69%), and a majority of attached employed workers in the European steady-state
(58.5%).
The remaining parameters of the model, σ and z, are not explicitly calibrated. Instead,
we set w =1a n ds h o w ,i nﬁgure 6, ranges of values of σ and z that are consistent, respec-
tively, with a unique American, a unique European and multiple SSPE. As the analysis
has shown, a unique American (European) SSPE is sustained for small (large) mobility
costs and low (high) risk aversion, and there exists a range of z and σ where multiple SSPE
exist. We regard σ ∈ [1,10] as a “realistic” range. Given our calibration, in the range where
multiple SSPE are sustained, the consumption of agents holding an average wealth level
is around one, implying that the relative risk aversion is of the same order of magnitude
23The model implies that a fraction π of the structurally unemployed exit unemployment even during the
ﬁrst two quarters. With 0.664 · 10.8% of the European work force being unemployed for more than two
quarters, the number of workers entering into structural unemployment in each period can be computed as
y = π/(1 − π)
2·0.664·10.8%. The implied frictional unemployment in Europe is then simply 10.8%−y/π =
1.3%. A similar calculation using American data yields 4.2% for the U.S..
29as the absolute risk aversion. For σ = 1, multiple SSPE arise when the mobility costs is
equivalent to 19.5-29 months of pre-tax wage, whereas for σ = 10 the corresponding range
is 16.5-23 months. These ranges are not particularly unrealistic, once both pecuniary and
non-pecuniary costs are accounted for. For instance, using micro data, Kennan and Walker
(2001) estimate the mobility costs to be of the order of several years of labor earnings.
In our calibrated economies, the attached median voter receives a positive transfer in
present discounted value terms from the UI system. Thus, she values UI from both an
insurance and a transfer motive. As a result, the European SSPE has the stark property
that attached workers vote for full unemployment insurance. The feature of our model
driving this result is the fact that, above the threshold ¯ b, taxes are linear in the beneﬁt level
because, except for the discrete change in mobility behavior at ¯ b, there are no additional
distortionary eﬀects of taxation. A richer model might include other distortions implying an
increasing marginal cost of taxation and beneﬁt provision. In this case, it may no longer be
optimal for attached workers to set full insurance. To illustrate this point in a reduced-form
fashion assume, for instance, that τ = TE(b+b2/2) rather than τ = TEb. Furthermore, set
σ =5a n dz = 9. Then, both SSPE exist and the beneﬁt rate in the European equilibrium
is 72%. In this SSPE, the average cost of taxation equals 1.36 dollars per dollar of beneﬁt
paid.
We have repeated the experiment for economies having the same parameters as in the
benchmark calibration, but with inﬁnitely lived agents (δ = 0). In this case, the transfer
eﬀect is never in favor of the median voter, and the political equilibrium features no UI
when agents are risk neutral, irrespective of z. Hence, there is no multiple SSPE for low
σ’s, whereas multiple SSPE emerge for larger risk aversion. Multiple steady states exist, for
some interval of z, when σ ∈ [1,20], although the range of parameters for which multiple
SSPE arise is smaller than in the previous case. For instance, if σ =5 ,w eh a v em u l t i p l e
equilibria for moving costs between 31 and 34 months of pre-tax wage.
To conclude, we emphasize that while our calibration shows that the possibility of
multiple SSPE is not a theoretical “curiosum”, but does arise for realistic parameters, it
is likely that other factors create diﬀerences in moving costs across countries. Our theory
shows that these diﬀerences need not be large in order for large diﬀerences in economic
outcomes to arise.
306 Conclusion
This paper has moved from the observation of three cross-country empirical regularities: (i)
unemployment is negatively correlated with geographical mobility, (ii) geographical mobility
is negatively correlated with the generosity of the unemployment insurance (iii) unemploy-
ment insurance is positively correlated with unemployment. Rather than taking institutions
and, in particular, unemployment insurance, as exogenous, we have taken the approach to
derive them as the outcome of rational collective choice.
We regard the analysis as fruitful in a number of respects. First, it shows that endo-
genizing political decisions can enlighten non-trivial self-reinforcing mechanisms, thereby
showing that large cross-country diﬀerences in economic performance need not arise from
large discrepancies in preferences or technology that might be diﬃcult to rationalize. Sec-
ond, we regard the methodological contribution of the paper to be of independent interest.
The paper provides a tractable framework that can be extended to the analysis of a variety
of dynamic macroeconomic problems with endogenous policy determination. At the same
time, the model is suﬃciently rich to enable a quantitative assessment of the theory.
Analytical results are obtained by exploiting properties of the CARA utility functions
(as in e.g. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) and Hassler and Rodr´ ıguez Mora (1999)). In future
work, we plan to examine to what extent the results are robust to an arguably more realistic
modeling of risk aversion, such as CRRA functions. Our analysis has also been simpliﬁed
by the assumption that agents vote once-and-for-all over a constant beneﬁt-tax sequence.
It is possible, however, to extend the analysis to allow for repeated voting, and show the
existence of multiple SSPE in the class of Markov Perfect Equilibria (details available upon
request). Although UI is typically lower than in the case of once-and-for-all voting, the
main qualitative results of this paper are therefore robust to the introduction of repeated
voting.
A general message of our paper is that existing social institutions aﬀect preferences
over these institutions. One conclusion from our results is that inertia in changing social
institutions may emerge endogenously, even if no exogenous cost of change is involved.
There is, for example, political support for a generous unemployment insurance in Europe,
despite a growing consensus that this causes high unemployment. If the insurance system
were dismantled, though, political support for restoring it might erode over time, which is
a positive conclusion. Note, however, that our model implies that it might even be socially
optimal for Europe and the U.S. to retain their respective status quo UI systems. Analyzing
this and other related normative questions is left for future work.
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347A p p e n d i x
7.1 Value functions













(1 − γ)e−σw + γe−σb
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(1 − γ)e−σw + γe−σ(w−z)
e−σw
















Solving these yields (6).
7.2 Proof of proposition 1
1 The threshold is found by solving Pa,0
³






7.3 Proof of proposition 2
First, the condition that w ≥ w(z) ensures that ¯ b ≥ 0, and that ν = 1 is an ESB for some
feasible levels of b including b = 0 (see Proposition 1).
Second, we need to show that Vn(1,0,0) ≥ supb∈(¯ b,w] Vn(0,τ(b,µs(1),0),b). We start by
observing that the function Vn(0,τ(b,µ0,0),b)i sc o n c a v ei nb. This follows immediately af-
ter noting that τ(b,µ(1),0) is a linear function of b.M o r ep r e c i s e l y ,τ(b,µ(1),0) = TAb. We
prove, next, that¯ b =a r gm a x b∈[¯ b,w] Vn(0,τ(b,µs(1),0),b) (thus, supb∈(¯ b,w] Vn(0,τ(b,µs(1),0),b)=
Vn(0,T A¯ b,¯ b)) if and only if z ≤ zA,w h e r e a s¯ b<argmaxb∈[¯ b,w] Vn(0,τ(b,µs(1),0),b)( t h u s ,
supb∈(¯ b,w] Vn(0,τ(b,µs(1),0),b)=Vn(0,T Ab,b)f o rs o m eb ∈
¡¯ b,w
¢
) if and only if z>z A.
To this aim, deﬁne ˜ bn,A ≡ argmaxb∈[0,w] Vn(0,τ(b,µs (1),0),b). Using the First Order Con-
dition and the fact that Vn(0,τ(b,µs (1),0),b)i sc o n c a v ei nb, it can be shown by standard
technique that ˜ bn,A = w − 1
σ ln
(1−Pn,0)TA
Pn,0(1−TA). The concavity of Vn(0,τ(b,µs (1),0),b)i nb also
ensures that ¯ b ≥ ˜ bn,A ⇔ ¯ b =a r gm a x b∈[¯ b,w] Vn(0,τ(b,µs(1),0),b), whereas ¯ b<˜ bn,A ⇔ ¯ b<
35argmaxb∈[¯ b,w] Vn(0,τ(b,µs(1),0),b)=˜ bn,A. Using the deﬁnitions of ¯ b and ˜ bn,A, we obtain

























Pn,1 (1 − TA)
¶
≡ zA.
Consider, next, the two cases separately. We ﬁr s ts t u d yt h ec a s ei nw h i c hz ≤ zA and
supb∈(b,w] Vn(0,τ(b,µs(1),0),b)=Vn(0,T A¯ b,¯ b). Since Vn(1,0,0) = Vn(1,0,¯ b)=Vn(0,0,¯ b) >
Vn(0,T A¯ b,¯ b), the American equilibrium is always sustained in this case. Next, consider the
case in which z>z A and supb∈(b,w] Vn(0,τ(b,µs(1),0),b)=Vn(0,T A˜ bn,A,˜ bn,A). In this
c a s e ,w en e e dt op r o v et h a tVn(1,0,0) ≥ Vn(0,˜ bn,ATA,˜ bn,A). Using the deﬁnition of the





































































ln(1 + Pn,1 (eσz − 1)) ≡ wA (z).
Finally, we need to prove that, ∀z>z A,w A (z) >w(z). This ensures that the threshold ¯ b
is positive in the American equilibrium. We prove this fact as part of the following more
general Lemma which will be useful again later in this paper.
Lemma 2 ∀z ∈ R+ \ zA,w A (z) ≥ w(z). Furthermore, wA (zA)=w(zA).












































Pn,1 (1 − TA)(eσz − 1) − (TA − Pn,0)








 (TA − Pn,0) − (TA − Pn,0)









Furthermore, since the sign of
∂WA(z)
∂z is determined by the numerator of the right hand side
expression in (19), and the numerator is increasing in z, then, clearly
∂WA(z)
∂z ≷ 0 ⇔ z ≷ zA.
But, since WA (zA) = 0, then it follows that WA (z) ≡ wA (z) − w(z) > 0 ⇔ z 6= zA,a n d
wA (zA)=w(zA). This proves the Lemma. QED.

























































T (1 − P)
− 1
T T−P
P2 and TA >P n,0.
7.4 Proof of proposition 3.
Proof: That a European Equilibrium is sustained when w<w(z), implying that ¯ b<0i s
an immediate implication of the fact that, in this case, ν = 0 is an ESB irrespective of b
(see Proposition 1).
The rest of the proof deals with the case in which ¯ b>0.We start by observing that
the function Va(0,τ(b,µ0,0),b)i sc o n c a v ei nb. This follows immediately after noting that
τ(b,µ(0),0) is a linear function of b. More precisely, τ(b,µ(0),0) = TEb. We now prove
by contradiction that the condition ˜ ba,E > ¯ b is necessary for an European Equilibrium
to exist. Suppose that there exists a European Equilibrium such that ˜ ba,E ≤ ¯ b. Then,
the concavity of Va(0,τ(b,µ0,0),b)i m p l i e st h a tVa(.) is decreasing in b for all b>¯ b.
Furthermore, Va(1,0,0) >V a(1,τ(¯ b,µ(0),1),¯ b)=Va(0,τ(¯ b,µ(0),1),¯ b) <V a(0,T E¯ b,¯ b) ≤
Va(0,T E˜ ba,E,˜ ba,E), which contradicts the statement that we are in a European equilibrium.
37Next, we prove that z>z E ⇔ ˜ ba,E > ¯ b.U s i n g t h ed e ﬁnitions of ˜ ba,E and ¯ b (see (10)
and Proposition 1)



























Next, we prove that, conditional on z>z E,w<w E (z) is necessary and suﬃcient for





































¶−TE 1 − Pa,0
1 − TE
Hence;




¶−TE 1 − Pa,0
1 − TE
and, ﬁnally,




















ln(1 + Pa,1 (eσz − 1)) ≡ wE (z).
Finally, we need to prove that, ∀z>z E,w E (z) >w . This ensures that there exist
European Equilibria such that the threshold ¯ b is positive. We prove this fact as part of the
following Lemma which will be useful again later in this paper.
Lemma 3 ∀z ∈ R+ \ zE,w E (z) ≥ w(z). Furthermore, wE (zE)=w(zE).












































Pa,1 (1 − TE)(eσz − 1) − (TE − Pa,0)








 (TE − Pa,0) − (TE − Pa,0)









Furthermore, since the sign of
∂WE(z)
∂z is determined by the numerator of the right hand side
expression in (19), and the numerator is increasing in z, then, clearly
∂WE(z)
∂z ≷ 0 ⇔ z ≷ zE.
But, since WE (zE) = 0, then it follows that WE (z) ≡ wE (z) − w(z) > 0 ⇔ z 6= zE,a n d
wE (zE)=w(zE). This proves the Lemma. QED.
7.5 Proofs of Lemma 1
Part 1. We know from Propositions 2 and 3 and from Lemma 2 (in the appendix) that
both wA (z)a n dwE (z) are increasing in z and that wE (zA) >w A (zA)=w(zA).
Next, deﬁne
∆w (z) ≡ wE (z) − wA (z)=K +l n
(1 + Pa,1 (eσz − 1))
(1/TE)
(1 + Pn,1 (eσz − 1))
(1/TA)
where K is a constant term which does not depend on z.S i n c e 1 /TE < 1/TA,t h e n
limz→∞ ∆w (z) < 0 implying, from continuity, that, for suﬃciently large z, wE (z) <w A (z).
Thus, from the intermediate value theorem, there must exists ˜ z>z A such that wA (˜ z)=
wE (˜ z).









































(γ+α)(π+γ+ρ)(γ+π)(ρ+α) > 0. Next, recall that w0
E (zA) >w 0
A (zA)=
w(zA), implying that ∆0
w (zA) > 0. Assume, now, in contradiction with the uniqueness of
˜ z, that there exist z2 such that z2 > ˜ z>z A a n ds u c ht h a t∆w (˜ z)=∆w (z2) = 0. Since
∆w (zA) > 0a n d∆0
w (zA) > 0 there needs exist ˆ z such that zA < ˆ z<˜ z and ∆0
w (ˆ z)=0 .
Additionally, from (21), ˜ z>ˆ z and ∆0
w (ˆ z) = 0 jointly imply that ∆0
w (˜ z) < 0a n d∆0
w (z) < 0
for all z ≥ ˜ z. But, then,there cannot exist z2 > ˜ z such that ∆w (z2) = 0. A contradiction.
This proves the uniqueness of ˜ z and concludes the proof of the Lemma.
39Part 2. From the deﬁnitions of zA and zE (see Propositions 2 and 3, respectively);
zA >z E ⇔
TA − Pn,0
Pn,1 (1 − TA)
>
TE − Pa,0
Pa,1 (1 − TE)
.
Rearranging terms and using the fact that Pa,1/Pn,1 = Pa,0/Pn,0,w eo b t a i n ;






Substituting into the left hand side inequality the expressions of Pn,0,P a,0,T A and TE,a n d
rearranging terms, we obtain
(π + ρ(1 − γ))α2−
¡












Given Assumption 1, the above inequality is satisﬁed if and only if α ∈ [0, ¯ α], where ¯ α is as
deﬁned in assumption 2. To conclude, we verify that the set of parameters satisfying both
Assumptions 1 and 2 is not vacuous. Let ρ → 0. Then, ¯ α → π and Assumption 2 imposes
no additional restriction.
Finally, the proof of Part 1 of the Lemma established that ˜ z>z A. QED
7.6 Proof of Claims in section 5
7.6.1 Bellman equations
Given a search strategy ν, it is immediate to show that the proposed value functions in









s.t.xt+1 =( 1 + ρ)(xt + it − ζtz − τ − ct),
if
ct = cω (xt,ν)=
ρ
1+ρ
xt + cω (ν),


























Thus, (22) ensures that the ﬁrst-order condition is satisﬁed. Then, substituting the

































which is the LHS of the Bellman equation.
Clearly, ν is chosen so as to maximize expected welfare, which given (13) is equivalent
to maximizing cω (ν)o v e rν.
7.6.2 Characterization of consumption and saving
There exist no closed form solutions for the consumption constants cω but we can provide
a close characterization of them. Consider ﬁrst nonselective behavior, in which case a
attached individual can become unattached, but never unemployed. Consumption and
welfare is under nonselective behavior determined by the ratio of the value functions of a
unattached and attached individual with the same level of assets, deﬁned as
∆a,1 ≡
eσcn(1)
eσca(1) = eσ(cn(1)−ca(1)). (23)
Using (23)the deﬁnition of ∆a,1 in (22) for ν =1a n dω = n,a, it follows immediately
that















deﬁning a strictly increasing relation between z and ∆1, independent of τ, which we invert
and denote ∆a,1 (z)w i t h∆a,1 (0) = 1 and ∆0
a,1 (z) > 0. Now, using (23) and (24) in (22)
41we can write ca (1) as a function of z and τ;
ca (1;z,τ)=w − τ −
ρln∆a,1 (z)+l n( ( 1− α)+α∆a,1 (z))
σρ
,
which deﬁning sa,1 (z) ≡
ρln∆a,1(z)+ln((1−α)+α∆a,1(z))
σρ yields one of the equations in (14).
Clearly, sa,1 (z)i n c r e a s e si nz and sa,1 (0) = 0, since ∆a,1(0) = 1.
Now, consider selective behavior, i.e., ν =0 . In this case, a attached individual can
become unemployed but not unattached and consumption and welfare is determined by the
ratio between the value functions of attached employed and unemployed, deﬁned as
∆a,0 ≡
eσca(0)
eσcu(0) = eσ(ca(0)−cu(0)). (25)
Using (25 in (22) for ν =0a n dω = r,u, it follows immediately that












− ρln∆a,0 − ln((1 − γ)+γ∆a,0)
σρ
,
deﬁning a strictly increasing and concave relation between (w − b)a n d∆a,0, independent of
τ which we yields the strictly increasing and convex function ∆a,0 (w − b)w i t h∆a,0 (0) = 1.
Deﬁning,
sa,0 (w − b) ≡
ln((1 − γ)+γ∆a,0 (w − b))
σρ
and using (25) and (24) in (22) we can write ca (0) as a function of b and τ;
ca (0;b,τ)=w − τ −
ln((1 − γ)+γ∆a,0 (w − b))
σρ
= w − τ − sa,0 (w − b).
To analyze the properties of sa,0 (w − b), we note from (26) that





























deﬁning an increasing concave mapping from sa,0 to w − b. Thus, the inverted relation,
sa,0 (w − b) is increasing and convex. It then follows that ca (0;b,τ) is increasing and concave




42Now, consider the unattached individuals. For nonselective behavior, (22) yields
cn (1;z,τ)=w − τ −
1
σρ





w h e r ew ed e ﬁne sn,1 (z) ≡ 1
σρ ln(α∆a,1 +( 1− α)). Clearly, cn (1;z,τ) is decreasing in z.
For selective behavior, we deﬁne
∆n,0 ≡ eσ(cn(0)−ca(0)).
Using (22) for ω = {f,r} and ν =0 ,w eg e t
γe−σ(ρ(w−τ)+cu(0)−(1+ρ)ca(0)) +( 1− γ)e−σ(ρ(w−τ)+ca(0)−(1+ρ)ca(0))(28)
= αe−σ(ρ(w−τ)+ca(0)−(1+ρ)cn(0)) +( 1− α)e−σ(ρ(w−τ)+cn(0)−(1+ρ)cn(0)) (29)
γ∆a,0 +1− γ = ∆
ρ










deﬁning an increasing relation between ∆a,0 and ∆n,0, which inverted yields the strictly
increasing function ∆n,0 = ∆a,0 = ∆a,0 (w − b). Using this in (22) yields,
cn (0;b,τ)=w − τ −
1
σρ
ln(α∆n,0 +( 1− α)), (30)
= ca (0;b,τ)+
ln∆n,0 (w − b)
σ
(31)
w h e r ew ed e ﬁne
sn,0 (w − b) ≡
1
σρ
ln(α∆n,0 (w − b)+( 1− α)).
Taking the log of the second line of (28), dividing by σρ and using the deﬁnitions of the
savings functions, we have

























= −ρ2σeσρsn,ν 1 − α
(eσρsn,ν − (1 − α))
2 < 0
deﬁning an increase and concave mapping from sn,ν to sa,ν, which inverted yields sn,ν as





an asymptotic slope 1
1+ρ < 1. Thus,
1. the savings of the unattached is always lower than that of the attached, and
2. the savings of the unattached is less sensitive to b or z than that of the attached.
Furthermore, since sn,0 is a convex increasing function of sa,0 passing through origo and
sa,0 (w − b) is a function with the same properties, we can write sn,0 = sn,0(w − b)a sa
convex increasing function passing through origo. Therefore, cn(0;b,τ) is increasing and
concave in b.
Finally, let us show that ca (0) ≥ ca (1) ⇔ cn (0) ≥ cn (1) Using the second lines of (27)
and (30) we have








w − τ −





≥ w − τ −






∆n,0 (w − b) ≤ ∆a,1 (z),
w − τ −
ln(α∆n,0 (w − b)+( 1− α))
σρ
≥ w − τ −
ln(α∆a,1 (z)+( 1− α))
σρ
,
cn (0) ≥ cn(1).
7.6.3 Aggregate law-of-motion and taxes
Consider, next, how the introduction of stochastic death aﬀects the dynamics of the distri-











44and Γ(νa) is as in (2). Using standard methods, we ﬁnd that the resulting long-run distri-



















γ + α + η
,
γ + η
γ + α + η
,0
¾
where η ≡ δ
1−δ. We assume that the government lends at borrows at a rate r. Its intertem-








where ut = 0 under nonselective behavior and




f0 − fs,0¢ γ
π + γ − α
¡
((1 − δ)(1− α))
t − ((1 − δ)(1 − π − γ))
t¢
,
where us ≡ α
α+η
γ
η+π+γ, and fs,0 ≡
η




us +( u0 − us)
r
r + δ +( π + γ)(1− δ)
−
¡
f0 − fs,0¢ γ (1 − δ)r













(δ +( α + γ)(1− δ))
γ (1 − δ)r
(r + δ + α(1 − δ))
¶
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